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ARGUMENT 
I. The More Well Reasoned Interpretation of the Plain Language of 
Section 78-14-4(2) is that the Medical Malpractice Two-Year 
Statute of Limitations Applies to All Persons, Regardless of Any 
Other Provision of Law, Including Section 78-12-35. 
The Plaintiffs erroneously claim that Defendant Dr. Grigsby takes no position 
regarding the proper interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) in his Brief before this Court. 
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' Supreme Court of Utah (SC) Brief, p. 15.) The Plaintiffs include in a 
footnote the interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) that was "urged by Dr. Grigsby in the 
proceeding below and in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC 
Brief, p. 13.) However, in point of fact, Defendant Dr. Grigsby's statutory interpretation of 
Section 78-14-4(2) "urged by Dr. Grigsby in the proceeding below and in his Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari." and quoted by the Plaintiffs in footnote 4 is the same interpretation that 
Defendant Dr. Grigsby continues to advocate in his Brief before this Court. In footnote 4 of 
their Brief before this Court, the Plaintiffs quote Defendant Dr. Grigsby's statutory 
interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) "urged by Dr. Grigsby in the proceeding below and in 
his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.": 
To illustrate, in order to make his statutory interpretation to the Court of 
Appeals, Dr. Grigsby had to rely on ellipses and bold emphasis to 
deemphasize intervening words in the statute. . . . "The provisions of this 
section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal 
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law." 
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, fn. 4, quoting Defendant Dr. Grigsby's/Appellee's Court of 
Appeals of Utah (CA) Brief.) However, in his Brief of the Appellant before this Court, 
Defendant Dr. Grigsby clearly indicated what he continues to assert is the proper 
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interpretation of the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2): 
the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) that clearly harmonizes its 
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose is where the 
two-year limitation period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority 
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law;' including Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. 
(Defendant Dr. Grigsby's/Appellants' SC Brief, pp. 21-22.) Contrary to the Plaintiffs' 
assertions, Defendant Dr. Grigsby's discussion in his Brief before this Court that 
harmonizes the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) with the legislative intent of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act manifests a clear position regarding the proper interpretation of 
Section 78-14-4(2). Defendant Dr. Grigsby's position as to the proper interpretation of 
Section 78-14-4(2) has been consistent and specifically argued before this Court as well as 
the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court. Defendant Dr. Grigsby continues to maintain 
that the more well-reasoned interpretation of the plain language of Section 78-14-4 indicates 
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations applies to all persons, 
regardless of any other provision of law, which contemplates Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 
and includes minority or legal disability under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36.1 
The Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Dr. Grigsby's "contention that 
defendant Dr. Grigsby is aware that the Utah Supreme Court determined in Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1983), that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) is unconstitutional 
as applied to minors. However, that decision does not apply to the present case as it is 
clear that the Utah Supreme Court confined the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-4(2) only to those circumstances when a minor has been injured. As Ms. Arnold 
was not a minor at the time of her alleged injuries, this issue is not before this Court. 
Therefore, when Dr. Grigsby discusses the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-14-
4(2), it is with the recognition that this Court has already ruled as to the issue of minor's 
claims. 
-2-
malpractice claims are never subject to tolling under any provision of Utah would require an 
awkward and strained reading of the statute's language, and would disregard the structure 
and punctuation of the provision." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 13.) In support of 
their allegation, the Plaintiffs cite the "last antecedent doctrine": 
"Under the last antecedent doctrine, relative and qualifying words, phrases, 
and clauses are to be applied to the immediately preceding words or phrases." 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 14.) However, the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out the limitations 
of the "last antecedent" rule: 
Of more plausibility is the County's invocation of the rule of construction 
known as the "last antecedent" rule, whereby qualifying words and phrases are 
generally regarded as applying to the immediately preceding words, rather 
than to more remote ones. We have no doubt of the correctness of that rule of 
construction as a generality, if applied in appropriate circumstances. But 
helpful as rules of construction often are, they are useful guides, but poor 
masters; and they should not be regarded as having any such rigidity as to have 
the force of law, or distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent. Their only 
legitimate function is to assist in ascertaining the true intent and purpose of the 
statute.... An even more fundamental rule of statutory interpretation 
helpful here is that the statute should be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished. 
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977). (Emphasis added.) The 
Plaintiffs ignore the "even more fundamental rule of statutory interpretation . . . . that the 
statute should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was 
sought to be accomplished." Id. Looking at the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act "in its 
entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished" would 
require the Plaintiffs to specifically address the purpose of the Act as expressly described in 
Section 78-14-2, which clearly indicates that the "stated purpose of the UHCMA is to 
-3-
alleviate health care costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time 'in which 
actions may be commenced against health care providers [J while limiting that time to 
a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated.'" Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, f 11, 94 P.3d 
915. (Emphasis added.) The Plaintiffs fail to provide any substantive discussion of Section 
78-14-4(2) in accordance with the purpose of the Act as expressly described in Section 78-
14-2.2 
Similarly, instead of following the "more fundamental rule of statutory 
interpretation," the Plaintiffs cite another "maxim of statutory construction that 'expessio 
unius est exclusio alterius' - that the expression of one thing is evidence of the exclusion of 
the other." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 18.) The Utah Supreme Court has also 
pointed out the limitations of this rule of statutory construction: 
Reliance is placed upon the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." It 
is appreciated that that maxim is sometimes helpful in determining the 
meaning of an otherwise questionable statute. But its only usefulness is for 
that purpose: as a rule of construction. It has no force of law; and it has no 
proper application when its effect would be to obstruct rather than to 
carry out the purpose of the statute. It has been aptly said that it is "a 
valuable servant, but a dangerous master.11 Whether it is helpful in 
understanding the intended effect of a statute depends upon an analysis of the 
legislative enactment to which it is sought to be applied. 
Rio Grande Motor Way v. Public Serv. Comm% 445 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1968). (Emphasis 
added.) It is interesting to note that the Utah Supreme Court expressly indicated that this 
2Significantly the Plaintiffs do not include Section 78-14-2 as a determinative 
statute in the "Determinative Statutes and Rules" section of their Brief of Appellees 
before this Court or their Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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maxim is "sometimes helpful" when a court must determine the meaning of an "otherwise 
questionable statute." Id. However, the Plaintiffs continue to claim that there is nothing 
questionable about the meaning of Section 78-14-4(2); therefore, this maxim would not 
seem to be helpful according to the Plaintiffs' position. (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 
13.) 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated that the proper application of such rules of 
construction are "to carry out the purpose of the statute." Rio Grande, 445 P.2d at 991. 
The Plaintiffs' brief is almost completely devoid of any discussion or any analysis of how 
their interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) carries out the purpose of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, as expressly stated in Section 78-14-2. Instead, the Plaintiffs merely 
restate the conclusory allegation that "application of the out-of-state tolling statute to 
medical malpractice claims does not defeat the purpose of the Act." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' 
SC Brief, p. 10.) 
The Plaintiffs imply that Dr. Grigsby's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2)—that the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations applies to all claims of all persons, 
wherein the phrase "regardless . . . of any other provision of law" is utilized as a general 
catchall phrase, which would include Section 78-12-35—would "render[] portions of, or 
words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 13, 
quoting Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997).) Although the 
Plaintiffs fail to provide any direct analysis of how the Utah Supreme Court's statement in 
Platts applies to Defendant Dr. Grigsby's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2), the unstated 
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assumption seems to require that the phrase "or any other provision of law" must render as 
superfluous the specific statutory reference—minority or legal disability under Section 78-
12-36—that precedes it. However, an analysis of the phrase "any other provision of law" in 
other statutes clearly indicates that the legislature repeatedly utilizes this phrase as a general 
catchall phrase, even though, technically, it would render as "superfluous" specific statutory 
references that precede it in each of the following sections. 
For example, in the "Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act," the 
legislature utilized "any other provision of law" as a catchall phrase despite the specific 
references that preceded it: 
(ii) The approval of an owner or operator under Subsection (4)(c)(i): 
(B) does not affect a right that the owner or operator has under: 
(I) Title 54, Chapter 8a, Damage to Underground Utility Facilities; 
(II) a recorded easement or right-of-way; 
(III) the law applicable to prescriptive rights; or 
(IV) any other provision of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-603(4)(c)(ii). (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the legislature utilized 
"or any other provision of law" as a catchall phrase in the Air Conservation Act when 
describing the powers of the board despite the specific references that preceded it: 
[The board may] consult, upon request, with any person proposing to 
construct, install, or otherwise acquire an air contaminant source in the state 
concerning the efficacy of any proposed control device, or system for this 
source, or the air pollution problem which may be related to the source, 
device, or system, but a consultation does not relieve any person from 
compliance with this chapter, the rules adopted under it, or any other 
provision of law; 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-104(3)(m). (Emphasis added.) The legislature also utilized "any 
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other provision of law" as a catchall phrase in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1212 despite the 
specific references that preceded it: 
(b) This section does not prevent the obtaining of allegedly pornographic 
material or material harmful to minors by purchase, subpoena duces tecum, or 
under injunction proceedings as authorized by this act or by any other 
provision of law of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1212(5)(b). (Emphasis added.) These other statutes clearly 
indicate that "any other provision of law" is often utilized as a legislative catchall phrase and 
that interpreting the phrase "or any other provision of law" as a general catchall phrase does 
not render the words that precede it, "minority or legal disability under § 78-12-36," 
superfluous or inoperative. 
Despite the Plaintiffs' claim to the contrary, Defendant Dr. Grigsby continues to 
maintain that the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) indicates that the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitation applies to all persons, regardless of minority 
or legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of law, including the out-
of-state tolling statute contained in Section 78-12-35. In other words, Defendant Dr. 
Grigsby's asserts that the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) indicates that the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitation applies to all persons' claims, 
including minors' claims, legally incompetent individuals' claims, and competent adults' 
claims when the defendant physician moves out of state, notwithstanding any other provision 
of law. 
The fact that the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) refers to "all persons" 
indicates that the legislature intended that the two-year statute of limitations for medical 
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malpractice claims applies to all person's claims, including the Plaintiffs'. This 
straightforward reading of the plain language of Section 78-14-4(2) was the basis for the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding and the Federal District Court of Utah's holding 
that medical malpractice claims are exempt from the general tolling statute. In the medical 
malpractice case of Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2005 WL 223765 (D. Utah) 
attached as Exhibit A, the Federal District Court for the District of Utah held that the plain 
language of Section 78-14-4(2) "provides an explicit exception to section 78-12-35 by 
requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply to 'all persons'": 
The Malpractice Act specifically provides that its two-year limitations period 
"shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability 
under Section 78-12- 36 or any other provision of the law. . . . " Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4(2). As the Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah 
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically to exempt a statute 
from the tolling statute, it will do so with clear, explicit language." Bonneville 
Asphalt v. Labor Comm % 91 P.3d 849, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because 
the Malpractice Act provides an explicit exception to section 78-12-35 by 
requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply to "all persons," section 
78-12-35 does not apply in medical malpractice cases. 
Id. at 4. (Emphasis added.) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that federal 
district court's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2): 
The district court held that medical malpractice actions were excepted from 
the tolling provision of § 78-12-25 because under § 78-14-4(2) the two-year 
statute of limitation period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority 
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law." The court held that this provision was an "explicit exception to section 
78-12-35" and that the limitations period was not tolled during [defendant's] 
absences. We agree. 
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech} Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607 (10th Cir.) attached 
as Exhibit B (emphasis in original.) 
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On the other hand, the Utah Court of Appeals interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) 
would "render[] portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." Platts, 947 
P.2d at 662. Although Section 78-14-4(2) specifically states that the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations shall apply to "all persons," the Utah Court of 
Appeals' interpretation effectively renders the term "all persons" inoperative by claiming 
that the statute of limitations applies to minors and legally incompetent adults but not to 
competent adults when the defendant physician moves out of state.3 In other words, the 
Utah Court of Appeals' holding requires an interpretation that the Utah legislature singled 
out minors' and mentally incompetent individuals' medical malpractice claims for tolling 
preclusion, while allowing a competent adult's claims to be tolled indefinitely if the 
physician happens to move out of state, despite the fact that the physician would still be 
subject to service of process under Utah's long-arm statute. According to the Plaintiffs, the 
Utah Court of Appeals interpretation is "the only reasonable interpretation." (Appellees' 
Brief, p. 12.) However, "all persons" should apply to all persons, including the Plaintiffs. 
Dr. Grigsby maintains that is the more reasonable interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2), and 
other credible courts have agreed. 
II. Whether Section 78-14-4(2) Can Reasonably Be Characterized as 
Ambiguous, This Court Still Needs to Interpret Its Provisions in 
Harmony with Other Statutes in the Same Chapter and Related 
Chapters. 
The Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Dr. Grigsby's position-that Utah Code Ann. § 
3Recognizing that the application of Section 78-14-4(2) to minors has already been 
determined by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 
1983), see footnote 1 supra. 
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78-14-4(2) is ambiguous as this statutory section has been understood by four different 
courts to have more than one meaning— as set forth in his Brief of Appellants to this Court 
is "an about face from his position in the lower courts." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 
13.) However, this is now an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Utah, not 
the trial court. As the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, "On certiorari, we review the 
decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court." John Holmes Constr., Inc. v. R.A. 
McKell Excavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, U 6, 131 P.3d 199. The mere fact that Defendant Dr. 
Grigsby has acknowledged that the Utah Court of Appeals understood Section 78-14-4(2) to 
have a different meaning than other courts, and therefore this statute can reasonably be 
characterized as ambiguous is not an "about face" from Dr. Grigsby's position in the lower 
courts. Instead, Defendant Dr. Grigsby maintains that his present position merely provides 
the appropriate deference to the opinions of the trial court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the 
the Federal District Court of Utah, and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
However, despite these courts' differing interpretations, the Plaintiffs continue to 
assert that there is only one "reasonable interpretation of Section 78-14-4." 
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 12.) The Plaintiffs allege that the interpretation of the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Federal District Court of Utah are unreasonable. 
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 15.) However, Utah courts have indicated: 
A statute is ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons to have different meanings. 
Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). (Emphasis added.) It 
is Dr. Grigsby's position that jurists of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Tenth Circuit 
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Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court and the Federal District Court of Utah, qualify as 
"reasonably well-informed persons" who have understood Section 78-14-4(2) to have 
different meanings. Giving these jurists the proper deference they warrant, it seems a bit 
dismissive for the Plaintiffs to claim that there is only one "reasonable interpretation of 
Section 78-14-4(2)." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 13.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "if we find a provision ambiguous, which 
causes doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning or application, we must analyze the act in its 
entirety and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and 
purpose.'" Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 185 (Utah 1998). However, whether Section 78-
14-4(2) is ambiguous is not the central issue to this Court's analysis as the same approach to 
interpreting its statutory construction would be followed regardless of ambiguity. The Utah 
Supreme Court has pointed out: 
When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the statute's plain language 
to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. 
Dist., 2002 UT 130, P 21, 63 P.3d 705. We read the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. State v. Schofield, 2002 
UT 132, P 8, 63 P.3d 667; State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, P 54, 63 P.3d 621 
(Regarding "whole statute" interpretation, the court stated: "'A statute is 
passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general 
purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in 
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious 
whole.'" (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 
96:05 (4th ed. 1984))). We follow "'the cardinal rule that the general 
purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the 
parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest 
object.5" Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 1986) (quoting 
Sutherland, supra, § 46:05). 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, % 17 (Utah 2003). (Emphasis added.) Therefore, whether 
-11-
this Court finds Section 78-14-4(2) to be ambiguous, it still needs to "read the plain 
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes 
in the same chapter and related chapters." Id. Such a harmonizing approach is clearly 
warranted when interpreting Section 78-14-4(2) as the purpose of the Act is clearly 
expressed in the same chapter in Section 78-14-2. The Utah Supreme Court has already 
indicated that "we ha[ve] no need to speculate as to what purposes the Malpractice Act was 
intended to serve because the purposes were set forth in § 78-14-2." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 
572, 580 (Utah 1993). {See also Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30, 31-32 
(Utah 1981) ("The avowed legislative purpose for treating the class of health providers 
differently from other defendants is stated in the Act itself.")) 
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that the trial court "astutely analyzed the issue" of 
whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations, set forth in 
Section 78-14-4, was subject to the general statutory tolling provision of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-35. Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 14, 180 P.3d 188. However, the trial 
court's analysis of Section 78-14-4 failed to "interpret its provisions in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter." The trial court's analysis is completely devoid of any mention 
of other statutes in the same chapter, in particular Section 78-14-2, when concluding that 
"the language 'or any other provision of the law' refers only to other provisions of the law 
which define iegal disability'": 
[I]t is clear to the Court that the language "or any other provision of the law" 
refers only to other provisions of the law which define "legal disability." This 
reading is supported by the fact that this language is contained within a 
dependent clause which refers back to, and clarifies the meaning of, the term 
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"all persons." The clause "regardless of minority or other legal disability under 
Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of [the] law" is contained within a 
single set of commas, indicating to this Court that the legislature intended the 
clause to refer to party status, rather than to removing this provision from the 
scope of all other provisions of law. 
Arnold, 2008 UT App 58,1j 14, quoting trial court's November 21, 2005 Order. Contrary to 
these findings, the trial court's analysis of Section 78-14-4(2) fails to "read the plain 
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes 
in the same chapter." 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals provided minimal discussion of the legislative 
intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act when it said: 
Dr. Grigsby further argues that interpreting section 78-14-4(2) as not 
preventing the application of section 78-12-35 to medical malpractice actions 
is contrary to the declared purpose of the Malpractice Act, as set forth in Utah 
Code section 78-14-2. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (2002). That section 
declares: 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to 
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while limiting that time to a 
specific period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to 
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 
Id. We conclude, however, that our interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) is not 
contrary to the purpose of the act, as it still substantially limits the statute of 
limitations period for malpractice actions and still provides the needed 
predictability for insurance companies in the vast majority of cases. 
Id. at f 19. Not being "contrary" to the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is 
not the same as construing Section 78-14-4 in connection with Section 78-14-2 "so as to 
produce a harmonious whole." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, P 54, 63 P.3d 621. The 
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Utah Court of Appeals, like the trial court, failed to follow "'the cardinal rule that the 
general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be 
interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object.'" Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 
P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 1986) (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction § 46:05 (4th ed. 1984))). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the connection between Section 78-14-2 and 
78-14-4, implicitly acknowledging the need to harmonize these two sections, although it 
made an exception for minors: 
The stated purpose of the Malpractice Act was to curb rising malpractice 
insurance rates, ensure, the availability of malpractice insurance, and reduce 
the cost of health care. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. The Act sought to 
accomplish these objectives, inter alia, by subjecting the malpractice 
claims of all persons, including minors, to a shorter statute of limitations 
than the four-year statute of limitations applicable to most other 
negligence actions and by abolishing all malpractice causes of action not filed 
within four years of the act of malpractice. 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1993). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court pointed 
out the interconnectedness between Section 78-14-2 and 78-14-4 in Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 
UT 50, % 11, 94 P.3d 915, indicating that the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act is to ease health care costs, as stated in Section 78-14-2, by establishing a specific 
window of time to bring malpractice actions in Section 78-14-4: 
However, the stated purpose of the UHCMA is to alleviate health care costs 
via the establishment of a fixed window of time "in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers [,] while limiting that time to a 
specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated." 
Id. Despite the Utah Court of Appeals' unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, indefinitely 
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tolling claims against a health care provider who moves out of Utah to practice health care 
elsewhere clearly defeats the purpose of "limiting that time to a specific period for which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated." Id. 
It is impossible for an insurance company to estimate or calculate how long a health care 
provider may remain out of state. 
It is difficult to understand how allowing a malpractice claim against physicians, who 
move from Utah to seek employment in another state, to be tolled for as long as the 
physician remains employed in another state "still substantially limits the statute of 
limitations." Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at f^ 19. Tolling a medical malpractice claim for an 
indefinite period of time does not limit the statute of limitations in any meaningful way. The 
Utah Supreme Court has previously pointed out that allowing an action to be commenced 
10, 20, or any indeterminate number of years after its origin does not harmonize with 
providing a definite limitation of time in which it must be brought: 
Under the interpretation and application of our statute contended for by the 
plaintiff, that the defendants' absence from the state tolled the running of the 
statute of limitations, an action against a nonresident motorist would 
practically never be outlawed. A purported claim could rest in suspense and an 
action could be commenced 10, 20 or any number of years after its origin, 
even though the plaintiff could have sued and served process any time he 
desired. It seems to us that such a result would comport with neither reason 
nor justice. Nor would it harmonize with the policy of the law of allowing 
a reasonable time for the bringing of an action, but of providing a definite 
limitation of time in which it must be brought or the matter put at rest. 
Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 256 (Utah 1964). (Emphasis added.) The Utah Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) also does not harmonize with the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act's purpose of "alleviatfing] health care costs via the establishment of a 
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fixed window of time 'in which actions may be commenced against health care providers.555 
Bowling, 2004 UT 50 at % 11. 
Similarly, it is equally unclear how the tolling a medical malpractice claim for an 
indefinite period of time "provides the needed predictability for insurance companies in the 
vast majority of cases,55 as the Utah Court of Appeals claims, when, according to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1 in 6 Americans move each year, and approximately 17% of those 
Americans will move out of state.4 The average American moves 11.7 times during his or 
her lifetime.5 Given the mobility of modem society, tolling the medical malpractice's 
abbreviated statute of limitations when a physician moves out of state to practice elsewhere 
does not provide the needed predictability for insurance companies and, indeed, is contrary 
to the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The clearly stated legislative intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to 
treat medical malpractice claims different from other claims. The legislature's expressed 
intent in enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was to limit the time for bringing a 
malpractice action to a specific period of time for all claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
2. In the medical malpractice context, the abbreviated two-year statute of limitations applies 
to all persons regardless of any other provision of the law, including general tolling statutes. 
The Utah Court of Appeals5 interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) failed to follow "the 
cardinal rule" that "the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control55 and 
4http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/geomob.html, visited on 
September 10, 2008. 
5Id. 
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Section 78-14-4(2) shall "be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest 
object." Faux, 725 P.2d at 1375. 
III. The Reasoning from the United State Supreme Court's Holding in Bendix and 
from Other Jurisdictions Indicates That the Court of Appeals' Interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-14-4(2) Would Negatively Impact Commerce and is 
Contrary to the Legislative Purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act; 
In Addition, Courts Should Avoid Statutory Interpretations That Promote 
Unconstitutional Infirmity. 
In Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
pointed out "that when exercising our certiorari jurisdiction granted by section 78-2-2(3)(a), 
we review a decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the parties should address the decision of the court 
of appeals." (Emphasis added.) The Utah Court of Appeals claimed that its interpretation 
of Section 78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
because "our interpretation should not cause malpractice insurance rates to increase and will 
not deter healthcare providers from leaving Utah." Arnold, 2008 UT App 58, If 19. 
Defendant Dr. Grigsby's Brief before this Court directly addressed this particular claim of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The claim of the Utah Court of Appeals that "our interpretation should not cause 
malpractice insurance rates to increase and will not deter healthcare providers from leaving 
Utah" clearly implicates interstate commerce. Id. The court in Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F. 
Supp. 240, 241-242 (N.D. Ohio 1990) clarified: 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue two and a half score 
years ago, and held that "the movement of persons falls within . . . the 
Commerce Clause." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172, 86 L. Ed. 119, 
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62 S. Ct. 164 (1941). Courts since then have followed suit, holding that 
interstate commerce is affected when persons move between states in the 
course of or in search for employment. 
As the Tesar court pointed out, "interstate commerce is affected when persons move 
between states in the course of or in search for employment." Id. Therefore, claim of the 
Utah Court of Appeals that "our interpretation . . . will not deter healthcare providers from 
leaving Utah" clearly implicates interstate commerce. Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at \ 19. 
The Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Grigsby's discussion of the impact of the Utah Court of 
Appeal's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) on interstate commerce is "merely a 
roundabout way of arguing that the out-of-state tolling statute violates the dormant 
commerce clause of the United States Constitution." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 23.) 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly indicated that "the briefs of the parties should 
address the decision of the court of appeals." Butter field, 831 P.2d at 101. The fact that the 
Utah Court of Appeals' decision may have constitutional implications should not improperly 
limit the parties ability to fully address the court's decision. 
The only basis that the Utah Court of Appeals provides for the claim that its 
interpretation will not impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce is the 
unsupported conclusion that "all medical providers need do to make sure the statute of 
limitations is not tolled if they leave Utah is appoint an agent within Utah to receive service 
of process for them."6 Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at Tf 19. Neither the Plaintiffs nor the trial 
6The Plaintiffs allege that "[t]here is no need for a statutory procedure authorizing 
a person to appoint an agent for limited purposes; the law already affords individuals that 
ability." (Plaintiffs/Appellees/ Brief, p. 23.) However, the Plaintiffs fail to provide any 
specific information as to how the ability afforded by the law translates into a procedure 
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court made such an argument. The Plaintiffs merely point out the immaterial fact that the 
"Court of Appeals adopted the very same interpretation of the statute as the trial court, and 
that the Arnolds urged on appeal." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 23.) The material 
difference is that neither the trial court nor the Plaintiffs have discussed or analyzed whether 
their interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) "is contrary to the declared purpose of the 
Malpractice Act, as set forth in Utah Code section 78-14-2." Arnold, 2008 UT App 58, f 19. 
Section 78-14-2 is never cited nor indirectly mentioned in either opinion of the trial court or 
any of the briefs or memoranda filed by the Plaintiffs before the trial court or the Utah Court 
of Appeals despite having been raised by Dr. Grigsby. 
Dr. Grigsby's primary point on appeal is that its interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) 
is the more well reasoned one because it is in harmony with the purpose of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act as expressly stated in section 78-14-2. On the other hand, the Utah 
Court of Appeals claims that its interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the 
purpose of the Act as expressed in Section 78-14-2: 
We conclude, however, that our interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) is not 
contrary to the purpose of the act, as it still substantially limits the statute of 
limitations period for malpractice actions and still provides the needed 
predictability for insurance companies in the vast majority of cases. Moreover, 
our interpretation should not cause malpractice insurance rates to increase and 
will not deter healthcare providers from leaving Utah. 
Arnold, 2008 UT App 58 at f 19. Dr. Grigsby has provided this Court with persuasive 
that allows an individual to register an appointed agent with the State. Dr. Grigsby was 
unable to find any readily apparent mechanism for registering an appointed agent with the 
State for limited purposes on the Utah Court's online page, "Finding People for Service 
of Process," http://www.utcourts.gov/howto/service/finding_people.html, or anywhere 
else on the Internet. 
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authority directly on point as to the incorrectness of the claims of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
However, the Plaintiffs decline to discuss the merits of any of the cited authority. For 
example, the Plaintiffs decline to discuss the merits of the persuasive authority found in 
Mcfadden v. Battifora, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595, 14-15 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004), 
attached as Exhibit C, that: 
There is no sound basis for imposing a burden on him that would not have 
been imposed had he remained a California resident, or forcing him to choose 
between a new job in a different state and unlimited exposure to litigation 
arising from his work in California. 
Similarly, the Plaintiffs decline to discuss the merits of the persuasive authority found in 
Tesar v. Hollas, 738 F. Supp. 240, 242 (N.D. Ohio 1990) that "it seems plainly 
'unreasonable' for persons who have committed acts they know might be considered 
tortious to be held hostage until the applicable limitations period expires." 
The Plaintiffs repeatedly claim that the Utah Court of Appeals is the "only reasonable 
interpretation of Section 78-14-4," but they decline to directly discuss whether the Utah 
Court of Appeals' interpretation is reasonable given the purpose of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, as expressly stated in Section 78-14-2. Instead of directly responding to 
the persuasive authority cited by Defendant Dr. Grigsby in Sections C and D of his Brief 
before this Court, the Plaintiffs attempt to curtail any discussion or analysis of this 
persuasive authority by stating that "a party may not raise issues for the first time on 
appeal." (Plaintiffs/Appellees' SC Brief, p. 23.) However, directly addressing the decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals does not constitute raising an issue for the first time on appeal. 
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In fact, the Court of Appeals' brief discussion of Section 78-14-2 was in direct 
response to the issue raised directly by Defendant Dr. Grigsby as to whether the 
interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) is in harmony with the legislative purpose found in 
Section 78-14-2: 
Dr. Grigsby further argues that interpreting section 78-14-4(2) as not 
preventing the application of section 78-12-35 to medical malpractice 
actions is contrary to the declared purpose of the Malpractice Act, as set 
forth in Utah Code section 78-14-2.... We conclude, however, that our 
interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the purpose of the act, as 
it still substantially limits the statute of limitations period for malpractice 
actions and still provides the needed predictability for insurance companies in 
the vast majority of cases. Moreover, our interpretation should not cause 
malpractice insurance rates to increase and will not deter healthcare providers 
from leaving Utah. . . . all medical providers need do to make sure the statute 
of limitations is not tolled if they leave Utah is appoint an agent within Utah to 
receive service of process for them. 
Pirnold, 2008 UT App 58 at f^ 19. (Emphasis added.) The point of this appeal is to address 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Despite the Utah Court of Appeals' claim that its interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) 
will "not cause malpractice insurance rates to increase and will not deter healthcare 
providers from leaving Utah" because Dr. Grigsby merely needed to appoint an agent within 
Utah to receive service of process for him to toll the statute of limitations, the United States 
Supreme Court has directly rejected such claims in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco 
Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), and its progeny. The Court pointed out: 
The suggestion that Midwesco had the simple alternatives of 
designating an agent for service of process in its contract with Bendix 
or tendering an agency appointment to the Ohio Secretary of State is 
not persuasive. . . . As we have already concluded, this exaction is an 
unreasonable burden on commerce. 
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Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894-895 (U.S. 1988). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the purpose of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act is clearly related to commerce: "the purpose of the UHCMA is to alleviate 
health care costs." Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, \ 10, 94 p.3d 915. Therefore, it is 
clearly appropriate to address whether the Utah Court of Appeals' s interpretation of Section 
78-14-4(2) will place an "unreasonable burden on commerce" that would undermine the 
express purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The United State Supreme 
Court's holding in Bendix clearly represents persuasive authority on this issue without 
analyzing the constitutional implications of the application of Section 78-15-35 on 
physicians who leave the state to seek employment elsewhere. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has indicated that the reasoning in United States Supreme 
Court decisions can be persuasive. In Merrill v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT App 214, \ 18, 
163 P.3d 741, the Court of Appeals indicated, "We find the reasoning from the United 
States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions helpful, and the analysis in treatises 
persuasive." The reasoning from the United States Supreme Court in Bendix and from other 
jurisdictions is helpful in addressing whether the Utah Court of Appeals's interpretation of 
Section 78-14-4(2) is reasonable given the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
as expressly stated in Section 78-14-2. 
Although the issue of whether the tolling statute, Section 78-12-35, unconstitutionally 
violates the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution is not before this 
Court, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix, and its progeny, underscore the 
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potential constitutional infirmities of the Utah Court of Appeals5 interpretation of Section 
78-14-4. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix, and its 
progeny, is consistent with the legislative intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
which clearly addresses the commercial impact of health care malpractice claims, and points 
to Dr. Grigsby's interpretation of Section 78-14-4(2) as being more well reasoned. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "we have "a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so 
as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or 
infirmities."' State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). This Court should construe the 
statutory phrase, "or any other provision of law," so as to avoid any conflict with the 
Commerce Clause and to harmonize with the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant/Appellant Dr. Grigsby respectfully 
requests that the Utah Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and determine that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is not subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-35 and uphold the summary judgment of the trial court. 
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LEAD ATTORNEY, Kristine M. Larsen, RAY 
QUINNEY & NEBEKER (SLC), SALT LAKE CITY, 
UT; Andrea Michelle Roberts, Thomas G. Stayton, 
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JUDGES: DALE A. KIMBALL, United States District 
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OPINION BY: DALE A. KIMBALL 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court on Defendants' 
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitation. A hearing on the motions was held on 
September 8, 2005. At the hearing, Plaintiff Valerie Ann 
Griffiths-Rast ("Ms. Griffiths-Rast") was represented by 
D. Bruce Oliver. Defendant Praveen Prasad, M.D. ("Dr. 
Prasad") was represented by Brandon Hobbs, and 
Defendant Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc. ("Sulzer Spine") [*2] 
1
 was represented by Andrea Roberts. Before the hearing, 
the court carefully considered the memoranda and other 
materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the 
motions under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the motions. Now 
being fully advised, the court enters the following 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1 Sulzer Spine refers to itself in its memoranda 
as "Zimmer Spine, Inc." However, for purposes 
of this Memorandum Decision and Order, it will 
be referred to as "Sulzer Spine." 
I. BACKGROUND 
The court finds that the following facts are 
undisputed. Ms. Griffiths-Rast sustained a back injury at 
work in February 1997. She was referred to Dr. Prasad 
by her Worker's Compensation carrier. In August 1997, 
after reviewing Ms. Griffiths-Rast's MRI scan, Dr. 
Prasad originally recommended physical therapy; 
however, during a follow-up visit on March 19, 1998, Dr. 
Prasad suggested that she undergo a surgical procedure, 
the BAK Cage implantation, to address her ongoing back 
pain. The BAK Cage is an interbody fusion device 
manufactured by Sulzer Spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated 
that prior to her March 19 visit with Dr. Prasad, she was 
doing better in physical [*3] therapy and able to lift 
seventy pounds, but she still had residual pain after 
physical therapy. She also indicated that Dr. Prasad told 
her with the surgery she had a ninety-five percent chance 
of going back to work after a six month healing process. 
Dr. Prasad performed the surgery on August 3, 1998. 
Prior to surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast signed a consent 
form that authorized Dr. Prasad to perform the surgery, 
and it identified the name of device to be implanted in 
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her spine. Following the surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
experienced complications and remained in the hospital 
for twelve days. 
During her deposition, Ms. Griffiths-Rast indicated 
that she was aware of a problem with the BAK Cage 
implantation immediately after the surgery during her 
hospital recovery. When asked if she "felt like there was 
a problem with the cage implantation" and "with what 
Dr. Prasad did," she answered affirmatively and further 
testified that "[everything went wrong." She also 
indicated that she attributed the pain she experienced 
after surgery "to something Dr. Prasad did or didn't do 
during the procedure" or "to some problem with the . . . 
cage device." Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated that she retained 
counsel [*4] a couple of weeks after her surgery "[w]hen 
[she] wasn't getting any better." 
On November 10, 1998, Ms. Griffiths-Rast received 
an SI injection from a doctor at Parkview Radiology who 
informed her that "there was a healing defect on the left 
side of [the] cage." Ms. Griffiths-Rast admits in her 
response to Dr. Prasad's motion for summary judgment 
that the earliest point where she could reasonably be 
aware of medical malpractice was during this visit to 
Parkview Radiology. 
On November 26,2001, Dr. Prasad was deposed in a 
case against another patient. During that deposition, Dr. 
Prasad indicated that he had moved out of Utah in 
September 2000. Dr. Prasad also intimated that while he 
was on Sulzer Spine's advisory board from 1998 to 2000, 
lie may have periodically been out of the state teaching 
the BAK Cage procedure to his peers around the country. 
Also on November 26, 2001, Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
served Dr. Prasad a Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action ("Notice") as required by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (2002) 
("No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the 
prospective defendant or his [*5] executor or successor, 
at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence 
an action."). Ms. Griffiths-Rast further claims that she 
did not discover the name of the manufacturer of the 
BAK Cage until a meeting with Dr. Prasad on October 4, 
2002. 
On November 26, 2002, a year after serving Dr. 
Prasad Notice, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed a complaint 
against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine alleging 
medical malpractice and products liability respectively. 
On January 30, 2003, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed an 
amended complaint to include certain factual allegations 
but her claims against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine 
remained the same. However, she did not serve Sulzer 
Spine with the amended complaint until February 11, 
2004. 
IL DISCUSSION 
1. Standard of Review 
A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate when 
the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. The movant bears an initial burden to 
demonstrate an absence of evidence to support an 
essential element of the non-movant's case. If the movant 
carries [*6] this initial burden, the burden then shifts to 
the non-movant to make a showing sufficient to establish 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
existence of that element. See Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 
477 U.S, 317, 324, 106 S, Ct, 2548, 91 L, Ed 2d 265 
(1986). 
The non-movant "must do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 
facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 a.S, 574, 586, 106 S. Ct 1348, 89 L. Ed 2d 
538 (1986). While the non-movant is entitled to the 
benefit of whatever reasonable inferences there are in its 
favor, the reasonableness of those inferences is 
scrutinized in light of the undisputed facts. Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 a.S 242, 256, 106 S Ct. 2505, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), A genuine dispute exists only if 
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 a.S, at 
248. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the 
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between 
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the 
requirement is that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact." Anderson, 477 a.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in 
original). 
2. Dr. Prasad's Motion 
Dr. Prasad argues [*7] that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's 
claims against him are barred by the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act ("Malpractice Act") which provides that 
"[n]o malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
injury, whichever occurs first." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
4(1) (2002). The discovery of a legal injury occurs "when 
the injured person knew or should have known of an 
injury and that the injury was caused by a negligent act." 
Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1999). Furthermore, '"[d]iscovery of a legal injury, 
therefore, encompasses both awareness of physical injury 
and knowledge that the injury is or may be attributable 
to negligence.'" Id. (quoting Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989)). 
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Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad with 
Notice on November 26,2001, she must have necessarily 
discovered her legal injury on or after November 26, 
1999 in order to pursue her claim. However, Dr. Prasad 
asserts that at Ms. Griffiths-Rast's deposition she 
admitted to discovering her injury immediately [*8] after 
surgery, which was on August 3, 1998, and thus well 
before November 26, 1999. Dr. Prasad further asserts 
that the latest possible date on which Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
discovered or should have discovered her legal injury 
was November 10, 1998 when a doctor at Parkview 
Radiology informed her of a "healing defect on the left 
side of [the] cage." Accordingly, Dr. Prasad concludes 
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims are barred by the 
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations whether her cause 
of action accrued in August 1998 or in November 1998 
because she served Notice well after the limitations 
period expired for either date. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast concedes that the earliest she 
could have discovered her legal injury was November 10, 
1998. However, she argues that Dr. Prasad's absence 
from Utah in September 2000 and his periodic absences 
between 1998 and 2000 tolled the two-year statute of 
limitations under Utah Code section 78-12-35. This 
statute provides: 
Where a cause of action accrues against 
a person when he is out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the term 
as limited by this chapter after his return 
to the state. If after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, [*9] the 
time of his absence is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
concludes that the time between September 2000, when 
Dr. Prasad left Utah, and November 26, 2001, when he 
was served with Notice, should not be computed against 
her. She also requests further discovery pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) in order to 
establish other periods of time Dr. Prasad was absent 
from Utah during 1998 to 2000. 
However, the court agrees with Dr. Prasad's 
argument that section 78-12-35 is inapplicable to toll the 
statute of limitations. The Malpractice Act specifically 
provides that its two-year limitations period "shall apply 
to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal 
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision 
of the law " Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2). As the 
Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah 
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically 
to exempt a statute from the tolling statute, it will do so 
with clear, explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v. 
Labor Comm'n, 91 P.3d 849, 852, 2004 UT App 137 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because the Malpractice Act 
provides an explicit exception [*10] to section 78-12-35 
by requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply 
to "all persons," section 78-12-35 does not apply in 
medical malpractice cases. 2 Thus, Ms. Griffiths-Rast's 
claim against Dr. Prasad was not tolled. Therefore, 
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast discovered or should have 
discovered her legal injury in August 1998 or November 
10, 1998 is immaterial because both dates are well before 
the date she served Dr. Prasad Notice on November 26, 
1999. Accordingly, Dr. Prasad's motion for summary 
judgment is granted. 
2 However, the Utah Supreme Court in Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), held that 
section 78-14-4(2) is unconstitutional as applied 
to minors because they have no standing to 
commence a lawsuit before they reach majority. 
See id. at 579. That reasoning is not applicable in 
the instant case because Ms. Griffiths-Rast was 
not a minor when her cause of action accrued. 
3. Sulzer Spine's Motion 
Sulzer Spine asserts that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims 
are barred by the Utah Product Liability Act's ("UPLA") 
statute of limitations, which provides that a plaintiff must 
commence a product liability claim within two years of 
the date that plaintiff "discovered, or in the exercise 
[*11] of due diligence should have discovered, both the 
harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3. The 
harm is the physical injury or illness suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct. McKinnon 
v. Tambrands, Inc., 815 F. Supp 415, 418 (D. Utah 
1993). In Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 
250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals 
interpreted the phrase "and its cause" to mean that the 
limitations period did not begin to run "until the plaintiff 
discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, the identity of the manufacturer." Id. at 253. 
The court "reasoned that lacking such information, a 
plaintiff could not know the cause of his or her injury." 
Bank One Utah, N.A. v. West Jordan City, 54 P.3d 135, 
2002 UT App 271 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (discussing 
Aragon and distinguishing the differences between the 
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and the UPLA's 
statute of limitations). Relying on this language from 
Aragon, Ms. Griffiths-Rast asserts that her products 
liability claim against Sulzer Spine was tolled by her 
inability to discover the identity of the BAK Cage 
manufacturer prior to her meeting with Dr. Prasad on 
October 4, 2002. 
"Generally, [*12] the question of when a plaintiff 
knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known, 
of a cause of action is a question of fact for the jury." 
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2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46290, * 
McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D. 
Utah 1999). However, this determination can be made as 
a matter of law when the evidence is such that no issue of 
material fact exists. Id. "What constitutes due diligence 
'must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It 
is that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the 
end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so.'" 
Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253 (citations omitted). 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast offers no evidence to suggest that 
she made the required due diligence inquiry to determine 
the manufacturer of the BAK Cage prior to meeting with 
Dr. Prasad. She argues that an affidavit of her counsel's 
paralegal, Jason Jensen, indicates that the nurse paralegal 
he contracted with to research the claims against Dr. 
Prasad provided internet literature for the LT-Cage rather 
than the BAK Cage and that, because of this, they were 
led to believe the LT-Cage was the device used. 
However, this does not demonstrate "due diligence." 
While Ms. Griffiths-Rast knew the name of the device 
implanted [*13] in her spine prior to her surgery, and 
she retained counsel to pursue her claim within a couple 
of weeks of the surgery, neither she nor her counsel 
undertook any effort to identify the BAK Cage 
manufacturer prior to meeting with Dr. Prasad. "The 
discovery rule does not allow plaintiffs to delay filing 
suit until they have ascertained every last detail of their 
claims." McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; see also 
McKinnon, 815 F. Supp. at 421. "All that is required [to 
trigger the statute of limitations] is . . . sufficient 
information to apprise [the plaintiffs of the underlying 
cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make 
further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions" about 
the defendant's actions. McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 
(quoting United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park 
City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993)). [*14] 
Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast had sufficient information 
immediately after her surgery to put her on notice that 
she may have a cause of action against the manufacturer 
of the BAK Cage, and she did not exercise due diligence 
in discovering the name of the manufacturer, her claim 
against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her failure to 
discover its identity. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast also asserts that her claim against 
Sulzer Spine was tolled by its status as a foreign 
corporation. Specifically, she contends that because 
Sulzer Spine is a foreign corporation and, at the time of 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's surgery, did not have a registered 
agent in Utah pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-21, it 
is not entitled to assert a statute of limitations defense. 
However, the case cited by Ms. Griffiths-Rast to support 
this assertion expressly rejected this argument. See 
Claws on v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72 
Utah 137, 269 P. 147 (1928). The plaintiffs in Clawson 
argued that because the defendant failed to comply with 
Utah law authorizing foreign corporations to conduct 
business in Utah, it was not entitled to use a statute of 
limitations defense. Id at 151. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected this argument [*15] and held that foreign 
corporations may assert a statue of limitations defense 
even if the corporation failed to register an agent or 
otherwise comply with statutes governing foreign 
corporations. Id. at 151-52. The court further stated that 
under the applicable Utah statute, a foreign corporation is 
only barred from "prosecuting or maintaining any action, 
suit, counterclaim, or cross-complaint in any court of the 
state. It does not prohibit such corporation from 
defending an action brought against it." Id. at 152. The 
court concluded that "[t]here is no condition tolling the 
statute [of limitations] as to foreign corporations." Id. 
Therefore, Sulzer Spine's status as a foreign corporation 
did not toll the statute of limitations, and Ms. Griffiths-
Rast's claim is untimely. Accordingly, Sulzer Spine's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment [docket # 54 and docket # 58] are GRANTED. 
Because there are no remaining claims against any 
Defendants, this action is hereby DISMISSED. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Dale A. Kimball 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District [*16] Judge 
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OPINION 
[*791] 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT' 
* After examining the briefs and appellate 
record, this panel has determined unanimously 
that oral argument would not materially assist the 
determination of this appeal. See Fed R App. P. 
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R 34.1(G). The case is 
therefore ordered submitted without oral 
argument. This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of 
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. 
R.32.L 
[**2] Plaintiff-appellant Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast 
appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
defendants-appellees Sulzer Spine Tech (Sulzer) and 
Praveen G. Prasad, M.D. Ms. Griffiths-Rast underwent a 
back surgery on August 3, 1998, during which Dr. Prasad 
implanted a "BAK Cage" manufactured by Sulzer into 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
subsequently served Dr, Prasad with a notice of intent to 
commence action on November 26, 2001, and filed her 
complaint on November 26,2002, alleging a violation by 
Dr. Prasad, of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 through 78-14-16 (1998), 
and a violation by Sulzer of the Utah Product Liability 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 through 78-15-6 (1998). 
The district court granted summary judgment to Dr. 
Prasad on the ground [*792] that the claim against him 
was barred by the two-year statute of limitation found in 
§ 78-14-4(1) and that the limitation period in that statute 
was not tolled by application of 78-12-35. The district 
court granted summary judgment to Sulzer on the ground 
that the claim against it was barred by the two-year 
statute of limitation [**3] found in § 78-15-3. Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast appealed, and we exercise our jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 
A. Standard of Review 
"We review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used 
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by the district court." Simms v. Okla. ex rel Dep't of 
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 
1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is 
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). A statute of limitation defense is an affirmative 
defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Where a defendant 
seeks summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative 
defense, 
[t]he defendant . . . must demonstrate 
that no disputed material fact exists 
regarding the affirmative defense asserted. 
If the defendant meets this initial burden, 
the plaintiff must then demonstrate [**4] 
with specificity the existence of a disputed 
material fact. If the plaintiff fails to make 
such a showing, the affirmative defense 
bars his claim, and the defendant is then 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Hutchinson v. Pfeilf 105 F.3d 562t 564 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
B. Claim Against Dr. Prasad 
Under §78-14-8: 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be initiated unless and 
until the plaintiff gives the prospective 
defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad a notice of intent to 
commence action on November 26, 2001. The district 
court granted Dr. Prasad summary judgment on the 
ground that the two-year malpractice statute of limitation 
barred Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claim because she should 
have discovered her legal injury prior to November 26, 
1999. It further held that the limitation period was not 
tolled by any periods of time during which Dr. Prasad 
was absent from the state of Utah. Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
argues that the grant of summary judgment was improper 
because a reasonable jury could [**5] have found (1) 
that the two-year statute of limitation should not have 
begun to run until July 2, 2001, the date she claims she 
discovered her legal injury, and (2) that the limitation 
period was tolled by § 78-12-35. 
1. Discovery of Legal Injury 
Under § 78-14-4(1): 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury, whichever 
first occurs, but not to exceed four years 
after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence. 
The two-year statute of limitation in this section begins 
to run when "the injured person knew or should have 
known that [she] had sustained an injury and that the 
injury was caused by negligent action." Foil v. Ballinger, 
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). "[Discovery of legal 
injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness of 
physical injury and knowledge that the injury is or may 
be attributable to negligence." Collins v. Wilson, 1999 
UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1999) (quotation 
omitted). "[A]ll that is [*793] required [**6] to trigger 
the statute of limitations is sufficient information to put 
plaintiff[] on notice to make further inquiry if [she] 
harbors doubts or questions." Macris v. Sculptured 
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, 24 P.3d 984, 990 (Utah 
2001). 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast testified in her deposition that 
"immediately after the [August 3, 1998, surgical] 
procedure," while she was still in the hospital recovering, 
she felt that there was a problem with the cage 
implantation, and there was a problem with what Dr. 
Prasad did, and that "[everything went wrong." Aplt. 
App., Vol. 1 at 77-78, 80. Ms. Griffiths-Rast also 
testified that she contacted a lawyer about the problems 
with her back surgery "a couple of weeks after [her] 
surgery" when she "wasn't getting any better," and that 
she signed an agreement retaining the attorney's services 
at that time. Id. at 104. Further, on November 10, 1998, 
another doctor informed Ms. Griffiths-Rast that there 
was a defect with the cage implantation. Id., Vol. 2 at 
204-05, 210. Ms. Griffiths-Rast produced no evidence in 
response to Dr. Prasad's summary judgment motion to 
refUte these facts, admitting that she had discovered 
[**7] the malpractice in November 1998. See Aplt. 
App., Vol. 2 at 210.' 
1 The argument presented in her response was 
that she discovered the malpractice in November 
1998. See Aplt. App. at 210. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that she did 
not discover her legal injury until July 2, 2001, when she 
received a report from a Dr. Stephen Wood stating that 
he had been told by the Utah Malpractice Insurance 
Page 3 
216 Fed. Appx. 790, *; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607, ** 
association that "there have been numerous malpractice 
suits filed due to complications resulting from The Cage' 
• . . [and that he] ha[d] been told that the procedure is no 
longer recommended." Aplt. App. at 200. Ms. Griffiths-
Rast argues that the determination of when she 
discovered her legal injury is a factual question not 
suitable for summary judgment. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast misinterprets the summary 
judgment standard. The question is whether there is a 
"genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of [**8] material 
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such 
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
nonmovant," Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 
935, 150 Fed. Appx. 819 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, no 
reasonable jury could find that Ms. Griffiths-Rast did not 
have sufficient information to put her on notice to 
conduct a further inquiry into whether there was 
malpractice until after November 26, 1999. In fact, she 
admitted that she believed that there was something 
wrong with Dr. Smith's performance immediately after 
the August 1998 surgery and that she hired an attorney a 
couple of weeks later to conduct an inquiry into possible 
malpractice. 
2. Tolling of Statute of Limitation 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues in the alternative that even 
if she was aware of her legal injury prior to November 
26, 1999, the limitation period should have been tolled 
for some of that time because (1) Dr. Prasad conducted 
business outside of Utah for periods of time between her 
surgery and September 2000, and (2) Dr. Prasad moved 
from Utah to California in September 2000. Under § 78-
12-35: 
Where a cause of action accrues against 
a person when he is out of the state, the 
action may [**9] be commenced within 
the term as limited by this chapter after 
his return to the state. If after a cause of 
action accrues he departs from the state, 
[*794] the time of his absence is not part 
of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that it is a disputed genuine 
issue of fact whether Dr. Prasad was absent for enough 
time so that tolling the statute of limitation for that period 
of time would result in the statue not being violated. She 
argues that the district court should have conducted a 
separate trial to decide this issue. 
The district court held that medical malpractice 
actions were excepted from the tolling provision of § 78-
12-35 because under § 78-14-4(2) the two-year limitation 
period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority 
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any 
other provision of the law." (emphasis added). The court 
held that this provision was an "explicit exception to 
section 78-12-35" and that the limitation period was not 
tolled during Dr. Prasad's absences. We agree. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues on appeal that the tolling 
provision in § 78-12-35 is applicable despite the 
language in § 78-14-4(2). [**10] She first directs us to 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 n.3 (Utah 
1997). In that footnote, the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that the family of a woman who allegedly died of 
malpractice argued that they should be able to file her 
suit outside the two-year statute of limitation because 
under §78-12-37: 
[I]f a person entitled to bring an action 
dies before the expiration of the time 
limited for the commencement thereof, 
and the cause of action survives, an action 
may be commenced by [her] 
representatives after the expiration of that 
time and within one year from [her] death. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled against the family on the 
ground that the statute of limitation had run prior to the 
woman's death. Jensen therefore does not support Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast's argument. A ruling that § 78-12-37 did 
not apply because the limitation period expired prior to 
the decedent's death, is not the same as ruling that § 78-
12-37 wowWhave applied if the limitation period had not 
expired. There is no indication that the court even 
considered the effect of § 78-14-4(2) on § 78-12-37. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast also argues that the Utah Supreme 
[**11] Court found that § 78-14-4(2) was 
unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Lee v. Gaufin, 
867 P.2d 572, 580-81 (Utah 1993), the court found that § 
78-14-4(2) created an exception to § 78-12-36, which 
generally tolls limitation periods as to claims of minors 
until the minor reaches the age of majority. Since Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast's brief does no more than note that Lee 
found § 78-14-4(2) unconstitutional in that it nullified § 
78-12-36, we can only assume that she is asserting, 
without argument, that it is also unconstitutional when 
applied to nullify to § 78-12-35. We disagree. 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lee was 
premised on the fact that, since minors had no legal 
capacity to sue in Utah, application of § 78-14-4(2) in 
some cases would result in the statute of limitation 
running prior to the minor coming of age and being 
legally able to bring his or her action. Lee, 867 P.2d at 
580. Consequently, application of § 78-14-4(2) would 
deprive some minors of access to the court system. Id. 
Here, there is no such problem. Considering the 
provisions of Fed. R Civ. P. 4(e), Utah R. Civ. P. 4 
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|**12] , and Utah's long-arm statute, § 78-27-24, 2 it is 
clear [*795] that a potential defendant's flight to another 
state will not immunize him from suit. Dr. Prasad was 
Jiimself served with process after he moved to California. 
2 Under Fed R Civ. P. 4(e): 
Unless otherwise provided by 
federal law, service upon an 
individual from whom a waiver 
has not been obtained and filed . . . 
may be effected in any judicial 
district of the United States: 
(1) pursuant to the law of the 
state in which the district court is 
located, or in which service is 
effected, for the service of a 
summons upon the defendant in an 
action brought in the courts of 
general jurisdiction of the State; or 
(2) by delivering a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to 
the individual personally or by 
leaving copies thereof at the 
individual's dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and 
discretion then residing therein or 
by delivering a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to 
an agent au tho r i zed by 
appointment or by law to receive 
service of process. 
Under the pertinent parts of Utah R. Civ. P. 
4(d)(1): 
(d)(1) Personal service. The 
summons and complaint may be 
served in any state or judicial 
district of the United States If 
the person to be served refuses to 
accept a copy of the process, 
service shall be sufficient if the 
person serving the same shall state 
the name of the process and offer 
to deliver a copy thereof. Personal 
service shall be made as follows: 
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual 
. . . by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the 
individual personally, or by 
leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion there 
residing, or by delivering a copy 
of the summons and the complaint 
to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive 
service of process[.] 
Under the pertinent parts of § 78-27-24: 
Any person . . . whether or not a 
citizen or resident of [Utah], who 
in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself, and if an 
i n d i v i d u a l , h is p e r s o n a l 
representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of [Utah] as to any 
claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any 
business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply 
services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury 
within this state whether tortious 
or by breach of warranty; 
[**13] 
3 Ms. Griffiths-Rast also raises a brief argument 
that under § 78-14-8 she was entitled to a 120-day 
enlargement of the four-year limitation period 
imposed by the statute of repose found in § 78-
14-4(1). This argument is meritless. First, the 
district court held that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's action 
was barred under the malpractice act's two-year 
statute of limitation, not the four-year statute of 
repose. Second, under § 78-14-8, a malpractice 
action may not be commenced unless the 
prospective defendant is given notice of the 
plaintiffs intent to commence an action at least 
ninety days prior to the filing of the suit. If the 
notice is served "less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the applicable time period, the time 
for commencing the malpractice action against 
the health care provider shall be extended to 120 
days from the date of service of the notice." Id. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast served her notice of intent in 
November of 2001. Ms. Griffiths-Rast admitted 
that she discovered her legal injury in November 
of 1998. Therefore, even if the date that she 
admitted discovery is used, the two-year statute 
of limitation period ran in November 2000, a year 
prior to the filing of her notice. 
[**14] C. Claim Against Sulzer 
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Under § 78-15-3, a legal action under the Utah 
Product Liability Act: "shall be brought within two years 
from the time the individual who would be the claimant 
in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due 
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its 
cause." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that because 
the statute of limitation in § 78-15-3 runs from the time 
the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered both 
the harm and its "cause," the reference to "cause" in that 
section "tolls the running of the statute of limitation until 
the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence 
should have discovered, the identity of the 
manufacturer." Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Because Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast did not file her complaint until November 
26, 2002, [*796] her claim is barred unless she did not 
discover, or in the exercise of due diligence should not 
have discovered, that the BAK Cage had injured her and 
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after 
November 26,2000. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast testified that she felt as if there 
was a problem with the cage implantation while [**15] 
she was in the hospital immediately after her surgery on 
August 3, 1998; that the BAK Cage hurt and "felt" like it 
was "defective"; and that she had been able to feel that 
the BAK Cage was defective since its implantation. Aplt. 
App., Vol. 1 at 80-81, 101-02. Because all that is 
required to start the running of the limitation period is 
information sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice to 
make further inquiry," Maoris, 24 P.3d at 990, we don't 
believe a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Griffiths-
Rast should not have discovered with the exercise of due 
diligence that the BAK Cage had injured her until after 
November 26,2000. 
The more difficult question is whether, as a matter of 
law, through the exercise of due diligence, she should 
have discovered that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the 
BAK Cage prior to November 26, 2000. The district 
court correctly noted in another case that "[generally, the 
question of when a plaintiff knew, or with reasonable 
diligence should have known, of a cause of action is a 
question of fact for the jury." McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 
50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D. Utah 1999). As noted 
above, however, the relevant [**16] question is whether 
there is a ''genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed. R 
Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of material 
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such 
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
nonmovant," Garrison, 428 F.3d at 935. The district 
court held that no reasonable jury could find that Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast had exercised due diligence in discovering 
that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the BAK Cage, and 
that "her claim against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her 
failure to discover its identity." Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 361. 
On appeal, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues again that she 
did not discover that she had a legal injury until July 2, 
2001, when Dr. Wood's letter told her about other 
malpractice claims that had been raised. Once she 
discovered that she had a legal injury, she "first 
commenced the medical malpractice portion of her suit 
before proceeding with the products liability aspect" of 
her suit. Br. of Aplt. at 35. She alleges that she did not 
begin her product liability case at the same time as her 
medical malpractice case because "she needed 
confirmation from [**17] Dr. Prasad [regarding] who 
the manufacturer was." Id. She argues that given the 
"fact" that she did not discover her legal injury until July 
2, 2001, and that she did not discover that Sulzer 
manufactured the BAK Cage until October 4, 2002, "[a] 
reasonable jury [could] find . . . that she did not 
reasonably discovery [sic] the name of the manufacturer 
of the BAKTM Cage until October 2002." Br. of Aplt. at 
39-40. 
We disagree. As properly noted by die district court, 
"[w]hat constitutes due diligence must be tailored to fit 
the circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which 
is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is 
reasonably calculated to do so." Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253 
(quotation omitted). It seems clear that in a normal case a 
reasonable jury could not find that it would take over two 
years to determine the manufacturer of a trademarked 
medical device when the party knows the correct name of 
that device. 4 [*797] The question then becomes 
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented evidence that 
would allow a reasonable jury to find that even if she had 
used "diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the 
end sought and which is reasonably [**18] calculated to 
do so," Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253, she should not have 
ascertained the identity of the manufacturer prior to 
November 26, 2000. She presented no such evidence. 
4 Sulzer presented the consent form signed by 
Mr. Griffiths-Rast showing that she was going to 
have spinal fusion surgery with "BAK cages." 
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 332, 341. In Ms. Griffiths-
Rast's appellate brief, she notes that one of the 
"assumptions" that she had made, that Dr. Prasad 
eventually corrected, was that the "BAK" in BAK 
Cage was a typographical error for the word 
"back."Br.ofAplt.at35. 
In fact, Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented the district 
court with the affidavit of a paralegal that worked for her 
attorney to help explain why it had taken four years to 
determine the manufacturer of the BAK Cage. The 
paralegal averred that the firm had contracted with an 
outside "nurse paralegal" who "was employed to research 
the claims against the doctor." Aplt. App. at 316. 
According to the affiant, the nurse paralegal "provided 
[**19] some internet literature" for a "LT-Cage," and 
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's attorney was "led to believe that 
the LT-Cage was a recently approved Cage from the 
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same manufacturer of the BAK Cage." Id. According to 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast, she and her attorney went to the 
October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad, "with literature 
concerning a the [sic] LT-Cage product manufactured by 
different [sic] company believing that was the product 
implanted into her," and Dr. Prasad informed them that 
they had the wrong device. 
Consequently, the evidence presented to the district 
court did not show that because of the circumstances of 
the case a reasonable jury could have found that with the 
exercise of due diligence she should not have discovered 
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after 
November 26, 2000. It showed instead that because the 
outside nurse paralegal led her attorney to the 
misunderstanding that die "LT-Cage" and the BAK Cage 
were made by the same company, she misidentified the 
manufacturer and proceeded under that misidentification 
until the October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad. 
court that Sulzer had gone through a [**20] number of 
company name changes and was a foreign corporation 
without a registered agent in Utah. She made no 
argument, however, that these facts impeded her ability 
to identify Sulzer as the manufacturer of the BAK Cage. 
Consequently, we see no error in the district court's grant 
of summary judgment on this issue. 
D. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to Dr. Prasad and Sulzer is 
AFFIRMED. 
Entered for the Court 
Bobby R. Baldock 
Circuit Judge 
It is true that Ms. Griffiths-Rast noted in the district 
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OPINION 
Appellant Lorna McFadden appeals from a judgment 
entered after a jury found that the statute of limitations 
barred appellant's medical malpractice action against 
respondents Hector Battifora, M.D., and Jeffrey 
Medeiros, M.D. We affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Certain facts are not in dispute. In May 1997, 
appellant Lorna McFadden went to see her doctor, Tadao 
Fujiwara, M.D., to investigate a lump in her left breast. 
Dr. Fujiwara ordered a mammogram and [*2] biopsy. 
After the biopsy, a nurse from Dr. Fujiwara's office 
called appellant and told her that she was to come in for a 
mastectomy. Later that same day, however, Dr. Fujiwara 
telephoned appellant to tell her she did not have cancer 
and repeated his assurances in person the next day. 
In June 1999, appellant, having moved to Las Vegas, 
went to have her breast examined at a new clinic in 
connection with a lump she felt at that time. ' She 
underwent a mammogram and biopsy in August of that 
year. This time the diagnosis was cancer, and in 
September 1999, appellant underwent a mastectomy, 
including removal of several lymph nodes. In addition, 
she underwent chemotherapy from November 1999 to 
February 2000. 
1 There was a dispute of fact concerning the 
location of the lump felt in 1999, and whether it 
was in the same location as the lump felt in 1997. 
In February 2000, appellant contacted a lawyer. The 
complaint for medical malpractice was filed on 
December 19, 2000, naming respondents, among others.2 
It was proceeded [*3] by the "Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action" required by statute whenever suit is 
brought against a health care provider. (See Code Civ. 
Proc, § 364, subd. (a).) The notice was served October 
13,2000. 
2 Due to the truncated nature of the proceedings, 
there is no evidence in the record explaining how 
respondents were involved in appellant's medical 
care. Dr. Medeiros is described in the briefs as a 
former pathologist for the City of Hope who 
diagnosed the tissue sample from the 1997 biopsy 
as non-cancerous. 
Several defendants, including respondents herein, 
sought a bifurcated trial on the statute of limitations as 
permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 597.5. 3 
Trial commenced on the statute of limitations defense. 
The only witness called was appellant herself. After 
hearing her testimony and reviewing certain medical 
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records introduced as exhibits, the jury answered the 
following questions in the affirmative: "Did [appellant] 
suspect, prior [*4] to October 13, 1999, that the alleged 
misdiagnosis was caused by someone's wrongdoing?" 
and "Would a reasonable person have suspected, prior to 
October 13, 1999, that the alleged misdiagnosis was 
caused by someone's wrongdoing?" 
3 Section 597.5 provides that "in an action 
against a physician" and other types of 
professional health care providers "based upon 
the person's alleged professional negligence" if a 
statute of limitations defense is raised and either 
party so moves, "the issues raised thereby must 
be tried separately and before any other issues in 
the case are tried." 
Following the verdict, the parties briefed the issue of 
whether the limitations statute should have been tolled 
with respect to Dr. Medeiros due to his absence from the 
state since May 1998, when he moved to Texas to take a 
new job. The court ruled that there was no basis for 
tolling, and judgment was entered in favor of respondents 
on July 8, 2002. This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
I 
The parties agree that the governing [*5] statute of 
limitations is found in Code of Civil Procedure section 
340.5, which provides in relevant part: "In an action for 
injury or death against a health care provider based upon 
such person's alleged professional negligence, the time 
for the commencement of action shall be three years after 
the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first." As 
explained in Kitzig v. Nordquist (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 
1384, 1391, this statute "sets forth two alternate tests for 
triggering the limitations period: (1) a subjective test 
requiring actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury 
was caused by wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test 
requiring a showing that a reasonable person would have 
suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing. 
[Citation.] The first to occur under these two tests begins 
the limitations period." 
Appellant contends that the essence of the 
underlying statute of limitations defense was that 
appellant "should have known, sometime between 
August 10 and October 13, 1999, that she was 
misdiagnosed in 1997, because [*6] Dr. Fujiwara's nurse 
told her in that year that she had cancer" and that 
respondents' position "rests solely on the belief that the 
nurse's comment — corrected by her physician hours later 
— should have triggered a suspicion of wrongdoing two 
years later." Selectively quoting from closing argument, 
appellant implies that this fact was "the linchpin of 
[respondents'] affirmative [statute of limitations] 
defense." 
Appellant misperceives the evidence that supported 
the jury's findings. The evidence demonstrated that 
appellant went to see Dr. Fujiwara about a lump in her 
left breast in May 1997. He ordered a mammogram and 
biopsy and, having received the results and consulted 
with other physicians, told her she did not have cancer. 
Two years later, in the summer of 1999, a new doctor 
diagnosed cancer in the same breast. Appellant 
underwent a mastectomy in September 1999. That is the 
point at which a reasonable person should have been 
suspicious of the original diagnosis of no cancer. Yet 
appellant did not submit the required statutory notice to 
her health care providers until October 2000, more than a 
year later.4 
4 If the statutory notice is submitted within the 
last 90 days of the limitations period, it extends or 
tolls the statute for up to 90 days depending on 
the precise day it was served within the 
limitations period. (Code Civ. Proc, § 364, subd. 
(d); Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal App. 4th 380, 
385.) 
[*7] The significance of the call from Dr. 
Fujiwara's nurse was not that it should have made 
appellant immediately suspicious of her doctor's 1997 
diagnosis. A patient is entitled to believe reassuring news 
from her doctor or another physician. In Kitzig v. 
Nordquist, supra, for example, the patient sought a 
second medical opinion and was assured in 1994 that she 
was being treated appropriately. She brought suit in 
1996, within a year of being told by other physicians that 
something was going wrong. The court held that she was 
not obligated to bring suit within one year of her initial 
suspicion since a patient should not be "placed in the 
position of conducting a full investigation" to determine 
whether litigation is appropriate after "the second doctor 
confirms that the first doctor is doing everything right." 
(81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.) 
To a similar effect is the decision in Artal v. Allen 
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, discussed in appellant's 
reply brief. There, appeal was taken from a judgment in 
favor of defendant based on a statute of limitations 
defense after the initial phase of a bifurcated nonjury 
trial. The facts indicated that [*8] plaintiff awoke after 
pelvic surgery in May 1998 with severe and persistent 
throat pain. Plaintiff saw at least 20 specialists in the next 
18 months and was given numerous conflicting 
diagnoses. In May 1999, she stated on a medical form 
that she believed her continuing pain was due to "some 
sort of trauma [that was] caused during intubation [for 
anesthesia during the surgery]." (Id. at p. 276, italics 
omitted.) In November 1999, plaintiff underwent 
exploratory surgery and was told that there was a fracture 
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in her thyroid cartilage, but not that it was or may have 
been caused by the intubation during the 1998 surgery. 
Nevertheless, the diagnosis caused plaintiff to attribute 
the fracture to the intubation. She filed her complaint 
against the anesthesiologist on October 27, 2000. The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence did not 
support the finding that plaintiff knew, or by reasonable 
diligence should have known, that her throat pain was 
caused by professional negligence until the 1999 
exploratory surgery. The court noted that "[plaintiff] was 
a model of diligence" in that "she consulted at least 20 
specialists in the 18 months following the May 8, 1998, 
surgery" [*9] and "was given some two dozen possible 
diagnoses, including tonsil infection, cancer, lupus, 
emotional and/or mental problems and asthma." {Id. at p. 
281.) Because "the necessary facts could not be 
ascertained without exploratory surgery" and diligence 
did not require plaintiff to immediately resort to surgery, 
the court could not agree that plaintiffs claim was 
untimely. {Ibid.) 
Appellant here admits that her suspicions of 
negligence were aroused after the 1999 diagnosis of 
cancer as soon as Dr. Fujiwara's diagnosis of no cancer 
in the same breast crossed her mind. To support her 
position that she did not have any misgivings prior to 
February 2000, she testified that the earlier diagnosis was 
driven from her head by the 1999 cancer diagnosis, 
surgery, and followup chemotherapy treatments, and that 
she "never thought about" the 1997 diagnosis until 
February 2000 when she was "reminded" of it by a 
friend. The nurse's call was significant because it cast 
doubt on appellant's testimony that she did not think 
about the 1997 diagnosis until February 2000. In 
response to appellant's theory, counsel for respondents 
argued in closing: "There are certain things in your [*10] 
life that you never forget. Being told you have cancer, 
thinking your are going to die, having the dark cloud 
surround you as [appellant] talked about, having the light 
shine back upon you, you never forget." Counsel further 
pointed out that appellant had been able to provide the 
doctors in Las Vegas with the names of her prior 
physicians and releases so that they could obtain her 
medical records, and told them about the prior biopsy. 
On those facts, the jury was entitled to believe that 
appellant was being untruthful when she claimed to have 
forgotten the traumatic occasion on which she was 
initially told she had breast cancer and then, a few hours 
later, told she did not. Accordingly, the jury had ample 
ground to believe that appellant's suspicion of 
wrongdoing was or should have been aroused in the 
summer of 1999, when she was diagnosed with cancer by 
the Las Vegas doctors and suffered the removal of her 
left breast. 
II 
The remaining issue has to do with tolling under 
section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure {section 351) 
which provides in relevant part: "If, when the cause of 
action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the 
action [*11] may be commenced within the term herein 
limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause 
of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of 
his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action." 5 Because Dr. Medeiros 
moved to Texas in May 1998, prior to the accrual of the 
one-year statute of limitations, appellant maintains that 
the statute has not run as to him.6 
5 Despite its language, courts have held that a 
defendant "need not 'enter' or 'return' to the state 
in order for the plaintiff to commence an action 
which takes advantage of the tolling provisions of 
section 357." {Green v. Zissis (1992) 5 
Cal.App.4th 1219, 1223.) In 1979, the California 
Supreme Court held that the modern availability 
of alternate methods of service in place of 
personal delivery of a summons and complaint, 
such as substituted service and service by 
publication, had no impact on section 35 Vs 
continued viability. {Dew v. Appleberry (1979) 23 
Cal.3d630, 634-636, 153 CaL Rptr. 219.) 
6 Appellant devotes a considerable portion of 
her brief to the issue of whether section 351 can 
ever be applied to toll the one-year medical 
malpractice limitations period due to a restriction 
on tolling found in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 340.5. Respondents concede that it can. 
[*12] In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco 
Enterprises (1988) 486 U.S. 888, 100 L. Ed. 2d 896, the 
United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio tolling 
statute similar to section 351 unnecessarily burdened 
interstate commerce because it barred foreign 
corporations from asserting a statute of limitations 
defense unless they maintained a presence in Ohio, but 
served no weighty state interest due to the fact that 
Ohio's long-arm statute permitted service on foreign 
corporations at any time. Bendix was applied to section 
351 by the Ninth Circuit in Abramson v. Brownstein (9th 
Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 389, which involved a 
Massachusetts resident who had entered into an 
agreement with two California residents. The California 
residents sued for breach of contract and fraud long after 
the fact, and relied on section 351 to establish that 
otherwise applicable statutes of limitations had been 
tolled. The Ninth Circuit held that applying section 351 
to the situation would impermissibly burden interstate 
commerce, reasoning that "[section 351] forces a 
nonresident individual engaged in interstate commerce to 
choose between being present in California for several 
[*13] years or forfeiture of the limitations defense, 
remaining subject to suit in California in perpetuity." {Id. 
at p. 392.) 
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In Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 
1276, this court considered whether section 351 was 
constitutionally sound when its provisions were applied 
to a California resident engaged in interstate commerce. 
In Filet Menu, California resident Warren Cheng was 
sued for breach of contract and other related claims. The 
complaint alleged that Cheng was absent from California 
for periods sufficient to toll the running of the applicable 
statutory period, but did not allege the specific reasons 
for Cheng's out-of-state travel. We concluded that 
"section 351 imposes a special burden on residents who 
travel in the course of interstate commerce that is not 
shared by residents involved solely in 'local business and 
trade . » . .'" (Id. at p. 1282, quoting Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 
891.) "Residents engaged in interstate commerce often 
travel outside the state to facilitate this activity, unlike 
residents who are otherwise occupied or employed. Thus, 
section [*14] 351 poses a hard choice to residents who 
engage in interstate commerce and who face potential 
liability arising out of this economic activity that section 
351 does not pose to other residents. Residents occupied 
in interstate commerce must curtail their travel outside 
the state in the course of interstate commerce to avoid the 
tolling provisions of section 351, or endure extended 
exposure to litigation because of their travel in the course 
of interstate commerce." (Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng, 
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283.) At the same time, we 
found no state interest to outweigh this burden since 
"residents are equally subject to service, regardless of 
their reasons for traveling out of state." (Ibid.) 
We found support for our conclusion in the case of 
Tesar v. Hallas (N.D. Ohio 1990) 738 F. Supp. 240, in 
which the court had held that "interstate commerce is 
affected when persons move between states in the course 
of or in search for employment" in applying Bendix to a 
case involving a defendant who had moved from Ohio to 
Pennsylvania to take a new job. Relying on numerous 
cases that held that interstate commerce is impacted 
when persons [*15] move between states to search for 
employment (id. at p. 242, and cases cited therein), the 
court concluded that there was no justification in forcing 
people to chose between an out-of-state job and enjoying 
the protections of the various statutes of limitations when 
Ohio's long-arm statute provided jurisdiction over all 
those alleged to have engaged in wrongful activity in the 
state (ibid.). 
We see no reason to depart from the views expressed 
in Filet Menu. Dr. Medeiros, a former California 
resident, moved to Texas to take a new job in 1998, 
thereby engaging in interstate commerce. He has been 
fully amenable to service under California's long-arm 
statute since that time. There is no sound basis for 
imposing a burden on him that would not have been 
imposed had he remained a California resident, or 
forcing him to choose between a new job in a different 
state and unlimited exposure to litigation arising from his 
work in California. Under Bendix, section 351 cannot be 
used to toll the otherwise applicable statute of 
limitations. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
CURRY, J. 
We concur: 
EPSTEIN, J., Acting P.J. 
HASTINGS, J. 
